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ALJ Central Panels: How is it Going Out There?*
Hon. W. Michael Gillette**
For over 40 years, administrative law mavens have touted the
desirability of “central panels,” i.e., panels of administrative law
judges who, instead of being attached to a single administrative
agency, are assigned to a “central,” “independent” panel that supplies
administrative law judges to conduct contested case hearings for a
variety of agencies.
The concept of the separate, independent body of administrative
law judges was sold to various states on a variety of theories, the
most important of which were (1) such panels would be free — and
be perceived to be free — of undue interference from the agencies for
which they worked, thereby promoting confidence in the decisions
that their judges made;1 (2) the very fact that such panels served a
variety of agencies would promote cross-training and increase
competence in the judges, in the same way that trial judges in the
traditional court system usually are “generalists” who are able to call
upon lessons learned in one kind of case to help solve other cases;
* Originally published in The Judicial Edge, a publication of The National
Judicial College
** Justice Gillette achieved senior status as an appellate judge in 2011 and
serves pro tempore in the Oregon trial courts. He is a member of the regional law
firm of Schwabe, Williamson and Wyatt, where he is a shareholder in the
commercial litigation practice group and is involved in the firm’s mediation and
arbitration practice. Justice Gillette has served as faculty for The National Judicial
College since 1980 and was the 2006 recipient of the College’s Payant Award for
Excellence in Teaching.
 Chief Judge Ann Wise of the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law puts
it this way: “The justification for an independent central panel is basic fairness; it is
not fair to combine into one person or political entity all of these powers: to
investigate (like police), to decide whether to bring charges (like grand juries), to
prosecute (like district attorneys), and to decide guilt or innocence (like judges or
juries).” Wise, Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An Independent
Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 30 J. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 95, 96 (2010).
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and (3) the variety of work would attract a more capable and
ambitious group of applicants for positions as administrative law
judges.
More than half the states have listened to the siren call and have
created such panels — the earliest (California’s) as far back as 1946.
As one who at first opposed, but later supported the creation of such
a panel in his home state, Oregon, the author now rises to ask the
following question: What have we wrought, and is it working as
advertised?
I.A REPORT FROM THE HINTERLANDS
First, let us consult that most reliable of sources — anecdotal
information.
The author, accompanied by his wife and partner-in-crime, Judge
Toni Boone, has had the opportunity, both in NJC classes in Reno
and in various other venues across the country, to talk to central
panel administrators and judges about their experiences. Most are
enthusiastic about the outward success of the decision to remove
them from the various agencies that they serve — the appearance of
fairness, at least, is significantly improved.
But a number of ALJs2 are less sanguine about the actual
relationship of their panel with at least some of the agencies they
serve. Those ALJs report that they feel pressured to rule in favor of
the agencies, at least in part because the central panel’s budget is
made up of incremental “payments” for the central panel’s services
by the agencies that they serve.3 In such circumstances, the agency is
the panel’s “customer,” and there is an ongoing concern that, if it is
dissatisfied with the panel’s work, the “customer” may attempt to
take its business elsewhere. The practice of deriving a panel’s
funding in whole or in part from the budgets of the agencies it serves
seems legitimate: it permits the legislature to keep track of the extent

 For simplicity, this article uses the familiar label, “ALJ” (for “Administrative
Law Judge”), although some central panels may use other designations for their
adjudicators.
 In one case, central panel ALJs reported that their supervisor required them
to provide the supervisor with pre-release copies of any opinions that ruled against
a state agency.
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to which an agency’s administrative adjudications absorb state
revenue. If, however, the agency retains the right to separately hire
ALJs, rather than use the central panel’s personnel,4 the central
panel’s budget (and, hence, its survival) is dependent on the good
will of its customers.
As noted, the foregoing concerns are based on anecdotal evidence
and information. They cannot be confirmed without creating
difficulties for the reporting ALJs, and (assuming that the reports are
true) they surely represent only a small fraction of the thousands of
cases heard annually by central panel ALJs. But someone needs to
put the concerns in print, if only to raise the consciousness of other
ALJs and bolster the determination of most central panel members
and their supervisors to fiercely protect their independence.
The second goal of the centralizing process — cross training for
more utility and flexibility — appears to have succeeded in some
places, but not others. (At least, not yet.) Initially, there were
difficulties with persuading new central panel ALJs, many of whom
had been transferred from where they had traditionally been housed
within particular agencies, that they needed to learn new areas of the
law. In addition, each agency customer wanted its own particular
needs filled by someone who wasn’t a “beginner” respecting the
agency’s applicable law. However, those problems tended to resolve
over time, as some ALJs retired and their replacements began work
in an atmosphere in which cross-training was the norm. But cross
training is a luxury. The panel has work to do, and it can do it most
efficiently if it assigns ALJs to particular agency hearings based on
the ALJ’s previous experience. The long-term goals of more
sophisticated, more flexibly available ALJs thus must be
accomplished incrementally, if at all. Literature on the topic is very
limited. There is a need for a report on this from those in the field, so
that those of us who advocate central panels can try to identify
strategies for accomplishing the cross-training goal.

 Of course, some central panel-enabling legislation specifically assigns
particular agency adjudications to the jurisdiction of the central panel. But even
that degree of connection is not necessarily permanent: an agency may have
sufficient political “clout” to obtain a legislative release from the jurisdiction of the
central panel.
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The third goal — a better group of candidates for ALJ positions
— is the hardest of all to evaluate. Certainly, the central-panels ALJs
and supervisors who have been students in classes that Judge Boone
and I have taught are an impressive bunch. However, they are also a
self-selecting group: they want to be good at their jobs, and seek
classes that will improve their skills. Still, those students come from
so many different jurisdictions that it seems fair to label this goal of
the centralizing process as one that is advancing satisfactorily.5
II.THE LAW OF UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES
Finally, it would be wrong to omit a reference to at least one
unexpected consequence to the centralization process: the struggle
over “deference.”
As a general proposition, most traditional courts, when
conducting judicial review of administrative decisions, give at least a
dip of the knee to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules and
even, on occasion, to an agency’s interpretation of statutes that it is
required to enforce. The degree of deference varies enormously from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the idea of it is constantly present:
agencies routinely ask for “deference.”
And there’s the rub. When an agency’s decision is, in fact, the
decision of an independent ALJ from a central panel, what theoretical
justification can there be for any form of deference? The usual
justifications are an agency’s particular “expertise” in an area of the
law, or an agency’s particular knowledge of what it meant to
accomplish by its own rules. But those rationales have no place in
judicial review of an independent ALJ’s disposition of an agency’s
contested case. The ALJ has no more expertise than does the
reviewing court, and the ALJ has no peculiar insight into the meaning
of a regulation, because she or he did not write the regulation. In such


Speaking only for himself, the author wishes to note that there is one flaw in
this situation: central panels are almost all limited, by law, to hiring law school
graduates. This is a foolish limitation, particularly because many of the skills that
an adjudicator needs are not taught in law school. The work of an ALJ requires
intelligence and effort, not a law degree. The author has met far too many superior
ALJs who were not (as one friend describes it) “JD impaired” to believe that the
potential pool of candidates should suffer this artificial limitation. That said, I
acknowledge that I am shouting into the wind: “It is what it is.”
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circumstances, traditional concepts of “deference” may go the way of
the dodo.6 Certainly, it seems fair to say that that particular
consequence was not in the minds of most advocates or opponents of
the central panel system.
Although a good deal has been written about the central panels of
various states (and the District of Columbia and the cities of New
York, Salt Lake City, and Chicago, all of which have versions of
central panels), those of us who have supported or opposed central
panels (and, as noted, the author did both) remain unsure as to what
we’ve created. For many of us, the issue lies less with the quality of
panel decisions — the judicial review process seems adequate to that
task — than with how the panels really work and whether the goals
many of their advocates set for them have actually been realized. It
may be that the answer to our questions lies in the province of other
disciplines — political science, for example — but, wherever it lies,
we sure wish someone would take on the task.
How is it going out there?

 For a particularly charming review of this conundrum, see A. Michael
Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdictions: Is there a
Deference?, 29 J. National Association of Administrative Law Judges 1 (2009).
Judge Nolan was a veteran ALJ in the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings.

